In the process of transformation from a centrally-planned to a market-orientated economy, the domestic financial sector plays two important roles. First, the financial sector itself has to be fundamentally restructured, and second, its efficient functioning is a crucial precondition for the necessary economic transformation. During the central-planning era, the financial sector typically carried out fiscal functions, namely it distributed subsidies and supported production plans. In a market-orientated economy, this fiscal function of the financial sector has to be altered to one of financial intermediation, in which the financial intermediaries mobilize, and efficiently allocate, capital. This includes the selection and monitoring of investment projects.
Transformation and the Role of the Financial System
The main objective of the transition process is to restructure the centrally-planned allocation of production factors into a market-orientated allocation process. The difference between the transformation process in transition countries and structural adjustment in other countries is that the former involves the fundamental change of the entire system.
1 In addition to the transformation of the economy, the political and cultural institutions must also be adapted.
This implies a fundamental change of all institutions 2 (Richter and Furubotn, 1996) , i.e., restructuring of ownership rights and distribution of resources, of the political and organizational framework, and of the formal and informal rules regulating relations between citizens, organizations and the government. This complex and far-reaching political, social and economic restructuring process affects all sectors of society. The financial sector, however, plays two important roles: First, its organizations and intermediation patterns must undergo fundamental restructuring; and second, its efficient functioning is a crucial precondition for the much-needed economic transformation of all sectors. Efficient reform of the financial sector is of the utmost importance for the transformation process (Schröder and Pieper, 1996) , in that the efficiency and the speed of financial sector reform has a decisive influence on the speed of the transformation process in the other sectors of the economy.
Moreover, the transition countries' increasing interaction in the global economy makes an efficient domestic financial sector even more important (Davis and Hare, 1997; EBRD, 1997) .
In the following section, the structure and financial services of the financial sector in a centrally-planned economy (CPE) and in a market-orientated economy will be discussed in 1 Socio-economic systems change. These changes can be gradual or abrupt, transitional or permanent in nature. The substitution of basic social and economic principles that leads to a new socio-economic system with different fundamental institutions and organizations is defined as transformation. In contrast, reforms are corrections on specific elements on the whole socio-economic system. These corrections can be characterized as readjustments while the basic economic principles are maintained (Hagedorn, 1993 , p.139 in Wolz et al., 1997 . 2 New institution economics (NIE) defines an 'institution' as a commonly accepted set of formal and informal rules and norms that determine coordination among individuals and structure their incentives towards a joint goal. North (1990) explains that 'Institutions are like the rules of the game in a competitive team sport. Organizations, the agents of institutional change, are analogous to sports teams'. Examples of institutions are markets, property rights, land, tree and animal tenure systems, indigenous insurance conventions, and other systems of exchange that are determined by implicit contracts, rules or social norms.
turn. Subsequently, the specific constraints and potential of the rural financial market resulting from the parallel process of transformation of the agricultural sector will be analysed. The final sections will present a discussion on the reforms which are necessary at the macroeconomic level and at various levels within financial organizations including the comprehensive adaptation of their financial instruments to meet the changing demands of the private agricultural sector.
Structure and Tasks of the Financial Sector under Centrally-Planned and Market-Determined Resource Allocation
In most transition countries, in particular the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), important political reforms have already been tackled successfully. Nevertheless, there is still a great need for reforms in the areas of institutions and infrastructure, and especially in the financial sector (Schröder and Pieper, 1996; World Bank, 1996) .
The Financial Sector in Centrally-Planned Economies
The formerly centrally-planned economies started their transition process with a passive banking system as regards the mobilization of savings and credit allocation. The role of banks in a centrally-planned state was restricted to providing financial resources for a pre-planned resource allocation. The scope for independent resource allocation was very narrow. The typical activities of banks in market economies such as: active savings mobilization by means of investment advice and by offering attractive investment opportunities; investment appraisal; selection; monitoring and risk management were unknown. The following characteristics were typical of the financial sector in centrally-planned economies:
(1) The Central Bank was under the direct control of the government and the savings mobilized domestically, whether by the state or privately, were directed towards the Central Bank. It, in turn, allocated the domestic savings and other financial resources from other sources such as money generation to the specialized sectoral monobanks. Beside traditional Central Bank functions, it also undertook normal banking transactions for the state and stateowned enterprises. These included account management, payment and clearing transactions as well as the provision of overdraft facilities on current accounts.
(2) Different sectoral monobanks had exclusive authority to finance their respective sectors. In Romania, for example, the following banks were in operation:
• Bank for Agriculture and the Food Industry, today known as 'Banca Agricola'. It was responsible for financial transactions in the agricultural sector, the agricultural input and output markets and the food industry;
• Investment Bank, today known as the 'Romanian Development Bank', responsible for the industrial and trade sector (excluding the agricultural sector); and the • Romanian Bank for Foreign Trade.
This sectoral monobanking structure also existed in other transition countries. In Romania, a specialized savings bank, Casa de Economii si Consemnatiuni, (CEC) was responsible for mobilizing and transferring private domestic savings to the Central Bank. In some transition countries, savings and credit co-operatives existed whose intermediation opportunities, however, were quite restricted.
In this system, in which the prices for all important goods and production factors were mandated by the government, production and cost-efficiency were not relevant. Thus, it is not surprising that the introduction of a market economy has revealed the weaknesses and problems which are the legacy of the former financial infrastructure. When the current state of the financial infrastructure in transition countries is compared with the requirements of a market-orientated financial system, the enormous challenge posed by the restructuring of the financial sector becomes apparent.
The Financial Sector in Market Economies
The main tasks of the financial sector in a market economy are the provision of a payments system, financial intermediation, financial asset transformation and diffusion (see Figure 1 ).
Clearly, differentiating between the intermediation and financial asset transformation functions may be difficult. Besides the financial sector's role as an intermediary between savers and investors, it has the following economic tasks: (1) to enforce financial discipline in the enterprise sector, and (2) to provide government economic policy with a framework for the implementation of its monetary policy. Based on an adaptation of the overview provided by Geis (1975) , the most important sectoral and economic functions of the financial sector are summarized in Figure 1 .
A fragmented and segmented financial sector cannot satisfy the requirements described in Figure 1 , because it can fulfil neither the regional, social and sectoral transformation nor the size and time transformation of financial assets. Financial intermediaries are subject to the same requirements of efficiency and competitiveness as the enterprise sector. In addition, there is no other sector that depends so strongly on the confidence of the market participants.
Due to the central and fundamental role that the financial sector plays in all economic sectors, strict regulations are applied to it. These take the form of a legal and regulatory framework tailored to the banking sector and include banking laws, banking supervision, regulations on risk management, investment screening and monitoring. This regulatory system has to be continuously adapted to be consistent with the growing depth of the domestic financial market 3 and its integration into the global financial market.
Also, the increasing liberalization of the domestic financial sector and globalization lead to a growing dependency of the financial sector, not only on the confidence of the domestic population but also that of the international community (as demonstrated by the financial crisis in South-East Asia in the autumn of 1997).
Transformation and Financial Sector Reforms
Lack of liquidity and poor management qualifications are the main constraints to the restructuring of enterprises. Only an efficient financial market can overcome this bottleneck.
Tackling all the tasks facing the financial sector in the process of transformation poses a great challenge for the transition countries, and the full extent of this challenge has become clear only during the course of transition. First, it is crucial to establish the necessary institutions and the appropriate legal and regulatory framework which will guarantee an independent, reliable and competitive financial sector. Some countries such as Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic states are on the right path. Other countries, particularly the countries that emerged from the former Soviet Union (FSU) as well as Bulgaria and, up until recently, Romania, still have a financial sector with strong government intervention. Their financial sectors lack independent and transparent banking supervision, they face restricted competition and are extensively subsidized (EBRD, 1997). Second, economic stability is necessary for a well-functioning financial sector. A distinctive feature of the transition countries is that economic stability and the efficiency of the domestic financial sector are interdependent. On the one hand, it is difficult for financial organizations to mobilize savings and offer long-term credit lines when inflation is high. On the other hand, a financial system that is misused to transfer government-mandated subsidies to loss-making state-owned enterprises also contributes to inflation (Heidhues, Davis and Schrieder, 1998) . Third, human capital formation is crucial to create an efficient financial sector. The implementation of the 'new rules of the game' requires training in banking, information technology, legal issues and business administration as well as adaptation to the country's specific situation. The necessary institution-building and human capital formation is a challenging task for the transition 3 The depth of a financial market can be characterized by the degree of the monetarization of an economy (M2/GDP), the number of banking outlets available per 10,000 persons, and by the quantity, countries. The extent and duration of this task were often underestimated at the beginning of the transformation process. Fourth, the privatization of equity and assets such as land must be developed and consolidated in order to facilitate financial intermediation. All countries set about tackling this issue at the beginning of the transformation process, albeit with varying degrees of intensity and consistency. In particular, due to information asymmetries, access to long-term loans depends on the availability of marketable private assets and collateral (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; Schrieder and Pieper, 1996) .
The following chapter will analyse more closely the specific problems of rural financial market development. In general, these result from the specific constraints of the agricultural restructuring process.
The Transition of the Agricultural Sector and Demands on Rural Financing
Many financial intermediaries in the countries of CEE and the FSU focus their financial intermediation on trade and working capital, preferably for urban enterprises. Their contribution to capital investments is negligible. The common practice of refusing investment loans reflects both the banks' awareness of the risks related to credit allocation and the lack of efficient measures to collect due loans. Banks in the agricultural sector are particularly affected by this practice (World Bank, 1996) .
Privatization and Credit Security
Privatization of the agricultural sector was among the first and most rigorous steps taken by most transition countries. In the CEEC-6, between 20 and 80% of arable land is now in private hands (see Figure 2 ). Arable land often became fragmented as a consequence of privatization. This rather negative aspect of privatization has been dealt with differently by each country. In Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary most of the owners of small, fragmented land holdings formed co-operatives and other forms of private enterprises. In Bulgaria, about half of the agricultural area is cultivated by a few large agricultural quality and diversity of financial services provision.
enterprises. Romanian and Polish agriculture is characterized by small-scale farm structures.
In Russia and the Ukraine, large-scale agricultural enterprises still dominate (Lucas, 1997) .
In most transition countries, ownership and user rights relating to restituted land and buildings are still unclear. Consequently, farmers' creditworthiness is limited, since restituted equity cannot really serve as collateral. As a result, banks in Romania, for example, hardly ever accept land and restituted buildings as loan security, preferring newly constructed and insured buildings for this purpose. In addition, restituted land and buildings are subject to a five and ten years' sales ban respectively. The uncertainties relating to property titles and the legal restrictions regarding land rent have significantly slowed down the process of restructuring the agriculture sector in the CEE countries 4 . Source: Grohs (1998) ; World Bank estimates.
Note:
The data reflect land use by private farms and not necessarily land ownership.
Loans as an Instrument for Subsidization
During transformation, open agricultural subsidies were cut back in the CEEC-4 due to restrictive monetary and fiscal policy 5 (Lucas, 1997) . However, indirect agricultural subsidization through government-mandated lending schemes has hindered the development of an efficient rural financial market. Most of these indirect subsidies have gone as 'soft' loans to bankrupt state-owned farms and not to the private agricultural sector. However, the former usually use these loans to cover their current operating costs, not to finance structural investments to increase their efficiency. By comparison, the private agricultural sector has very limited access to credit and is not able to finance inputs or capital investments. Thus, even dynamic farmers have difficulty in carrying out the necessary structural adjustment in their enterprises and production processes.
Agricultural Input and Output Markets and Rural Finance
In most transition countries, the founding of private enterprises in rural trade, processing and craftsmanship was not permitted under central planning. However, for a rural region/economy to function well, the existence of an agricultural input and output market is very important.
Regional development that is mainly dominated by the agricultural sector requires the creation of processing facilities and marketing channels on both the supply and the demand side.
Moreover, new and expanding rural off-farm enterprises create jobs. An empirical study carried out in Timis, Romania, showed that small and medium enterprises that were creditrationed by the formal financial sector employed 30% fewer workers than enterprises having access to external capital sources .
Without access to credit, private agricultural and non-agricultural enterprises have to rely exclusively on their self-financing capacity. In a restructuring process, however, the selffinancing capacity does not suffice to cover the extremely high financing demand for operational and equity capital. This illustrates that the rural financial market plays a fundamental role in the transition process. Yet, the constraints that have their origins in the central-planning era present significant obstacles to growth.
Lack of Financial Depth
So far, only a few transition countries have reorganized their banks such that they are now capable of supplying the private sector with adequate medium-and long-term loan facilities (EBRD, 1997). Financial instruments which allow the financial sector to provide medium-and agricultural gross income, while the Polish agricultural sector received 28% of agricultural gross long-term loans corresponding to the broad range of investment needs are missing. This ability depends on financial depth, which, in turn, is closely correlated to the monetarization of the economy. The level of monetarization can be measured using the ratio of broad money (M2) to gross domestic product (GDP) 6 . The degree of monetarization reflects public confidence in the financial sector and economic stability. The higher the monetarization, the greater the efficiency of the financial sector in mobilizing financial assets for economic growth. In the late 1980s the degree of monetarization was about the same in all transition countries. However, loss of confidence in the financial sector due to high inflation rates has since caused large divergencies.
According to the World Bank (1996) , money in circulation (M1) reached, on average, only 42% of GDP in CEE countries and in countries of the FSU just 20% (see Figure 3) . This is a difficult basis for a domestic financial sector to mobilize financial savings from the population.
In comparison to the OECD countries, also illustrated in Figure 3 , money in circulation (M1) in the FSU and CEEC amounts to 27 and 56% respectively of M1 in the OECD countries.
The tendency to keep liquid financial assets in local currency is thus relatively low. This can be attributed to the high inflation expectations and a lack of confidence in the domestic financial system. In 1996, financial depth (M2/GDP) for the CEEC-4 was, on average, 56.2%
and for the CEEC-6 around 50% (EBRD, 1997). The average M2/GDP for the 18 OECD countries evaluated was significantly above 75% (IMF 1997) . The indicator M2/GDP shows that Romania's financial depth is far lower (about 28.9% in 1996) than would reasonably be expected for countries with a similar level of GDP per capita of US$ 1,437. The negative real deposit interest rate that prevailed until 1997 provided little incentive to save in the domestic financial system. The tendency was to retain financial savings either as foreign exchange or to invest them in real assets. Overall, the tendency to invest in financial assets is relatively weak, not only in Romania but in most transition countries. 
Special Problems of Rural Finance in Transition Countries
In most of the transition countries there are five major problem areas influencing the development of rural financing. Clearly, the extent of these problems may differ from country to country: (1) the continued existence of inefficient state-owned enterprises; (2) the economic and institutional results of subsidizing such enterprises; (3) the problem of debts inherited from the former system, (4) the problems of financing private farm and non-farm small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and (5) a lack of economic diversification in rural areas.
(1) Inefficient State Enterprises: At the beginning of the transformation it was commonly assumed that the privatization process could be carried out quickly and completely. Many factors have proven this assumption to be unrealistic. In many countries political opposition has played a major role. In many cases, state-owned enterprises carried forward large debts or were near bankruptcy. Thus, privatization was impossible or realistic only after restoration of profitability. Furthermore, unprofitable enterprises were maintained due to labour politics. As far as the agricultural market is concerned, many countries were suspicious as to whether the domestic market could guarantee food security. Therefore, it was deemed necessary that state-owned farms should maintain a minimum of food security. This is the reason why Romania has not yet privatized state-owned farms. These farms have been converted into commercial enterprises under state control according to the Law on the Restructuring of State-Owned Enterprises (No.15/1990) . They are often unprofitable and can only be maintained through subsidization. Besides direct subsidy, soft loans are the most common form of subsidization used by the government. Consequently, the equity/debt ratio of creditunworthy enterprises not only continues to deteriorate, so that they remain unable to repay their debts, but the banks also suffer due to the increase in bad loans, and themselves lose creditworthiness and credibility. For some time, the major part of the loan portfolio in the CEE countries and FSU countries was overdue. In 1996, the share of overdue loans varied between 7% and 40% ( EBRD, 1997) . This policy undermined the most basic principles of sensible banking practice, namely to examine the clients' creditworthiness and the profitability of the proposed investments. It is not surprising that under such conditions efficient and competitive banks did not develop. Thus, banks reduce their range of services to short-term loans, preferably secure trade loans, and completely withdraw from investment financing (World Bank, 1996) . In some countries, 'crowding-out effects' could be observed, meaning that after serving state-owned enterprises from the available credit portfolio little was left for private enterprises. The abuse of the credit system to continue financing unprofitable stateowned enterprises is one of the fundamental barriers to the development of rural finance.
(2) Macro-Economic Consequences: The supply of credit to unprofitable enterprises has an inflationary effect. In this context, the inflationary effect depends on the dimension and type of financing. It is assumed that, for example in 1993/94, more than two-thirds of the credit expansion contracted with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were used to finance stateowned enterprises in deficit in the agricultural sector. If these loans are financed through money-creation, this will result in inflationary pressure. The increase in loan demand does not correspond to the increase in production if the loans are consumed by unprofitable enterprises. Thus, inflationary pressure reduces the economic stability needed to develop the financial sector. Obviously, the subsidization of state-owned enterprises through credit lines is only possible if the Central Bank is subject to government intervention. Therefore, the independence of the Central Bank is a fundamental prerequisite for stopping this practice.
(3) The Problem of Inherited Debts: The strategy applied to tackle the problem of the inherited debts of state-owned banks and enterprises is especially important for the development of the financial system. Debt relief, or the transfer of the losses to the government, without a sound plan of action for improving efficiency (which includes restructuring of management and credit allocation) can undermine efforts to introduce healthy investment criteria and financial discipline. If governments are too willing to help insolvent banks, this will create the impression that it will continue likewise in the future. In some countries, for example Poland, banks were subject to restrictions with regard to credit allocation and were given incentives to improve their credit rating and supervision (EBRD, 1997) . Furthermore, the restructuring of insolvent enterprises must include rigorous training measures, the introduction of competitive, market-orientated principles and bankruptcy procedures. This is essential for the development of an effective financial sector.
(4) The Financing of Private Farms and Small and Medium Off-Farm Enterprises:
The privatization and restitution of land to the former owners was one of the first reforms carried out in most of the transition countries. In many transition countries, this process has led to unprofitable farm sizes with little or no credit-worthiness. In Romania, for example, the arithmetical average farm size is 2.2 hectares (Toderiu, 1997). As mentioned above, uncertainty relating to land titles and other obstacles to privatization prevents farmers from using land as credit security. A second problem relates to the successor banks of the former monobanks and their lack of interest in financing the private sector, especially small farms and craftsmen's businesses. In addition to the lack of collateral of SMEs, the small loan size involves high costs, and banks are not familiar with SMEs. In Romania, for example, less than 2% of the total credit portfolio of the Banca Agricola is allocated to small farms . It is very unlikely, therefore, that banks which focus on the large stateowned enterprises will seriously engage in financing the newly privatized and small farms despite the liberalization of the financial market. The solution is much more likely to be found in reforming the financial sector, reducing the transaction costs per credit unit and thus opening up to new market segments. With the help of appropriate innovations, the transaction curve of financial intermediaries will be pushed to the left (see Figure 4) . The ideal case would be a leftward movement of the transaction curve for those on the supply side as well as for those on the demand side (Heidhues, Davis and Schrieder, 1998) . Despite the fact that the weaknesses of the financial sector in transition countries have been recognized, many structural policy decisions have not yet been carried out. Table 1 roughly compares the progress and weaknesses of the financial sector in the CEEC-6 according to different criteria (Schröder und Pieper, 1996) . The most striking features are: • that the differences between the reform-friendly countries, i.e., the CEEC-4, are significant; and
• that Hungary's financial sector is the most advanced of all countries presented in Table 1 . Notes: + positive development; ++ extremely positive development; -unsatisfactory development; --poor development; ± unsatisfactory development with positive aspects in individual sectors.
The deficits within financial sector reform become particularly evident if one concentrates on rural finance. Looking at the CEE and CIS countries in general, the status of reforms has reached average scores 7 of 6.7 as regards the liberalization of agricultural prices and markets and 6.1 as regards the completion of land reforms; the average score is lowest for rural finance with 5.3 in 1997 (Grohs, 1998) . In respect of the CEEC-6, the picture points in the same direction, but the reforms have already reached a higher level. Nevertheless, in comparison to the other reform areas listed, rural finance reforms are the least advanced with an average score of 6.7 (see Table 2 ). Among the CEEC-6, Bulgaria is listed with a rural finance score of 4 and Romania with 6. The other countries have reached score of 8.
Under these conditions, it is unlikely that the rural financial market will be able to satisfy rural enterprises' capital demand appropriately, neither with regard to the extent nor the financial products demanded in the near future. The high transaction costs (information and risk costs) and the current financial sector and interest rate policies impede the financial intermediaries from serving the rural sector under the given privatization situation. From an institution economics approach, the solution for the transaction cost dilemma lies in the development of financial innovations which would enable the financial intermediaries to serve these market segments. This includes the implementation of laws and regulations governing capital structure, risk management and the valuation of assets for balance-sheet preparation. Control over the implementation of laws and regulations should be exercised by an independent banking supervisory agency with the appropriate legal authority. The extended law on the privatization of banks in Romania of 1997 goes in this direction. It provides the foundation for (1) the privatization of state-owned banks; (2) the restructuring of the Romanian National Bank; and (3) the liquidation of insolvent banks by court order (Romaniabusiness, 1997) .
Changes in the organizational structure and management of financial intermediaries can be defined as organizational financial innovations. Giassemi (1997) finds it imperative to restructure banks and/or their management to reduce market entry barriers for certain market segments such as the private agricultural sector in transition countries. It is more than possible, however, that the rural market will not immediately profit from a restructured and thus more efficient banking sector. Instead, restructured financial intermediaries will first try to meet the unsaturated credit demand of the industrial and service sectors in urban areas before moving into the rural areas. Savings and credit co-operatives may be the more appropriate financial intermediaries to supply rural enterprises with financial services because of their rural member structure and business philosophy. If savings and credit co-operatives became more professional and implemented an intra-nationally comparable banking supervision apparatus, this would contribute significantly to a more efficient rural financial intermediation. The emerging microfinance movement in the CEE countries could also contribute to improving rural financial intermediation (OECD, 1996) Within the financial organizations, product innovations are important to satisfy the real financial service demand of the rural clientele. Only if access to credit-financed investment capital is improved, can the process of development and economic growth accelerate. Thus, it is crucial to improve the supply of medium-and long-term loans. At present, the traditional forms of credit collateral are burdened with various kinds of restrictions and are thus avoided by the financial intermediaries in most transition countries. Innovative loan collateral alternatives must, therefore, be sought. In Croatia and Poland, stocks and production assets are used as a loan collateral by means of innovative leasing contracts (World Bank, 1996) .
Also, the development of attractive financial assets can have a positive effect on financial depth through financial capital accumulation.
In summary, the financial sector reforms discussed in this paper involve fundamental changes in the structure, the legal and regulatory framework, and the instruments applied by the financial sector as well as changes in the surrounding private and public sector environment.
The necessary political and institutional decisions, their implementation and the required human capacity building will take time -certainly more time than was assumed at the beginning of the transformation process.
